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Issuing CL-Signatures on Speed:
Signing with a Constant Number of Exponentiations
Thomas Groß
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, UK
Abstract. In SCN 2002, Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya have proposed
the Strong RSA version of their Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme [8],
a fundamental cryptographic building block to compute a digital signature on
hidden committed messages and allow zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge on
them. Ever since, the CL signature scheme has been adopted for different appli-
cations, such as anonymous credential systems, Direct Anonymous Attestation,
and different prototypes for smart cards. Unfortunately, CL signatures place a sig-
nificant workload on the issuer, as the signature generation requires a number of
modular exponentiations linear in the number of message blocks signed, which,
in turn, constitutes a significant obstacle for the broad adoption of the scheme.
In this work, we propose a variant of the Strong RSA CL-signature scheme, which
computes the signature with a constant number of modular exponentiations, that
is, independent of the number of message blocks involved. In fact, we show that
issuer can compute a commitment on an arbitrary number of message blocks with
one modular exponentiation and complete the signature generation with five mod-
ular exponentiations. All the issuer needs to do is store n group elements readily
available from the standard key generation with its private key and use this knowl-
edge in the signature generation. The output of the optimized CL-issuing is fully
wire-format compatible to the standard CL-issuing. We provide a comprehensive
performance analysis of the optimized issuing approach, which shows that signa-
tures with strong security parameters and even with tens of thousands of message
blocks can be computed in the order of one hundred milliseconds.
1 Introduction
Digital signature schemes are a foundational cryptographic building blocks that offer
integrity and non-repudiation. The Camenisch-Lsysyaskaya (CL) signature scheme [8]
an interesting primitive in this family, as it enables signatures on hidden committed
messages and subsequent access on message blocks of the signature with kown discrete-
log based zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [21,14,16,10,3,12]. There have been
various proposal to adopt CL-signatures in different application domains, such as in
Anonymous Credential Systems [7] or prototypes for smart card [2]. Is has found wide-
spread adoption in computer systems from laptops to virtualization servers with Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM) in the guise of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [5]. But
there have also been recent proposals to issue CL-signatures on many message blocks,
such as in large-scale signatures on cloud topologies [17].
Independent of whether we look at small devices or large servers, efficiency of the
signature scheme was often named by sceptics as caveat. One of the greatest benefits
of the scheme, that all message blocks are available in the exponent, also impedes its
performance. The performance for issuing as well as proving knowledge of a signature
is dependent on the number of message blocks encoded: The number of modular expo-
nentiations needed is always linear in the number of the message blocks. Let us compare
that with signing an X.509 certificate with a standard RSA signature: An issuer writes
all message blocks, such as certificate Version, serial number, validity, subject in a mes-
sage and computes just one RSA signature on it, that is, computes one modular expo-
nentiation. For CL-signatures that is different: As the messages blocks are encoded in
the signature itself, one needs to have a separate base and needs to compute one modular
exponentiation for each. In our X.509 example the issuer would need to compute more
than 10 exponentiations to complete a CL-signature. Camenisch and Gross [6] have
approached this problem with special encoding, the Camenisch-Groß(CG) encoding, to
fold many binary and finite-set attributes into a single message block, which reduces
the number of exponentiations significantly. Still, the fundamental problem remains.
A long story short: Issuing Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures is expensive. And
one key reason for that is that multiple operations in the signature generation need mod-
ular exponentiations linear to the number of message bloack. Perhaps issuers will think
twice whether they adopt a scheme that uses many exponentiations, i.e., valuable cycles
on highly secure infrastructure, for which the computation time is even dependent on
the size of the message, when they could compute an RSA signature for a certificate
with just one exponentiation. The higher computation time means a lower through-put,
which may indeed create an obstacle for high-frequency issuing such as for identity
systems with millions of users.
In this research, we tackle a key problem identified: that issuing standard CL-
signatures costs modular exponentiations linear in the number of message blocks. We
present for the first time a variant of the CL-issuing that uses only a constant number
of modular exponentiations wrt. the number of message blocks. In fact, the issuer can
compute a commitment in one modular exponentiation and the core signature genera-
tion in five modular exponentiations, with an exponent bitlength in the size of the group
order. This is in the same order as computing a standard RSA signature.
How is this improvement possible? We propose to make full use of the informa-
tion the issuer has readily available. In particular, according to the standard issuing of
CL signatures [18], the issuer is privy to the discrete logarithms between the message
bases and the group generator. We modify the signature scheme to store this knowledge
as part of the issuer’s secret key, that is, to store one group element for each message
base. This aditional knowledge allows the issuer to lift the computations necessary for
the issuing to the exponent group by a discrete-logarithm reduction. To complet the
computation, the issuer can then perform a single modular exponentiation in the normal
group. The discrete-logarithm reduction we employ here, that is, lifting computations
to the exponent and using discrete logarithms to bridge between bases, is already a
known concept in cryptography. We are the first, however, to recognize that the SRSA
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya key generation has all information at its disposal to employ the
reduction throughout the issuing process, which yields a strong efficiency advantage for
an optimized CL-issuing.
The issuing scheme we present is highly performant, even for CL-signatures with
tens of thousands message blocks. In our comprehensive performance analysis, we
come to the conclusion that even such signatures can be computed in the order of 100–
300 ms. This performance is strictly better than the standard CL-issuing, and by many
orders of magnitutes better. It enables issuing of signatures with many message blocks,
which was previously thought unviable. It thereby enables new application areas such
as signatures large data structures or network topology graphs.
Our contributions are, first, in the conceptual evaluation of the discrete-logarithm
reduction for an efficient issuing of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. While the idea
of using discrete logarithms and a lifting to the exponent group is already known, this is
the first time that this technique has been systematically employed for the CL-issuing.
It applies all issuing steps from commitment computation and verification, to signing
and credential updating. Thus, we see the merits of this work mostly in lessons learned
for efficient implementation. Second, we offer a detailed specification on an optimized
version of the CL-issuing that makes good use of the technique. The optimized issu-
ing only requires a small constant number of modular exponentiations: Whereas the
standard CL-issuing takes on the order of number of message blocks plus five exponen-
tiations, the optimized issuing only takes five. Third, we offer a detailed asymptotic and
experimental performance evaluation based on the function of the Identity Mixer library
and strong security parameters, which shows clearly that the optimized CL-issuing of-
fers advantages with signatures with few message blocks as well as signatures with
message blocks previously thought unfeasible. The presented optimization makes the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme more viable for broad adoption. In fact, we
believe that the optimized CL-issuing opens the door for completely new applications
of the signature scheme.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Assumptions
Special RSA Modulus A special RSA modulus has the form N = pq, where p = 2p′+ 1
and q = 2q′ + 1 are safe primes, the corresponding group is called special RSA group.
Strong RSA Assumption [20,1,16]: Given an RSA modulus N and a random element
g ∈ Z∗N , it is hard to compute h ∈ Z∗N and integer e > 1 such that he ≡ g mod N . The
modulus N is of a special form pq, where p = 2p′+ 1 and q = 2q′+ 1 are safe primes.
Quadratic Residues The set QRN is the cyclic subgroup of Quadratic Residues of
a special RSA group with modulus N . The order ord(QRN ) = p′q′ is the cardinallity
of the set. We write 〈S〉 = QRN to state that this set is generated by a generator
S. The order ord(S) is the period of S and defined as the smallest number, such that
Sord(S) ≡ 1 (mod N), where ord(S) = p′q′.
2.2 Integer Commitments
Damgård and Fujisaki [14] showed for the Pedersen commitment scheme [19] that if it
operates in a special RSA group and the committer is not privy to the factorization of the
SPK{(α, β) : y = gαhβ}(m)
Commitment y˜ = ga˜hb˜, where a˜ and b˜ are uniformly chosen random numbers.
Challenge c = H(context‖y‖y˜‖m)
Responses aˆ = a˜+ ca and bˆ = b˜+ cb The prover sends (y, c, aˆ, bˆ) to the verifier.
Verification The verifier computes yˆ = y−cgaˆhbˆ and cˆ = H(context‖y‖yˆ‖m).
The verifier accepts if cˆ = c, otherwise the verifier aborts.
Fig. 1. Compilation of a signature on m with y = gαhβ to a non-interactive Σ-protocol.
modulus, then the commitment scheme can be used to commit to integers of arbitrary
size. The commitment scheme is information-theoretically hiding and computationally
binding. The security parameter is `. The public parameters are a group G with special
RSA modulus N , and generators (g0, . . . , gm) of the cyclic subgroup QRN . In order
to commit to the values (V1, . . . , Vl) ∈ (Z∗n)l, pick a random R ∈ {0, 1}` and set
C = gR0
∏l
i=1 g
vi
i .
2.3 Known Discrete-Logarithm-Based, Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In the common parameters model, we use several previously known results for proving
statements about discrete logarithms, such as (1) proof of knowledge of a discrete log-
arithm modulo a prime [21] or a composite [14,16], (2) proof of knowledge of equality
of representation modulo two (possibly different) composite [10] moduli, (3) proof that
a commitment opens to the product of two other committed values [4,10], (4) proof
that a committed value lies in a given integer interval [3,10], and also (5) proof of the
disjunction or conjunction of any two of the previous [13]. These protocols modulo a
composite are secure under the strong RSA assumption and modulo a prime under the
discrete logarithm assumption.
Proofs as described above can be expressed in the notation introduced by Camenisch
and Stadler [11]. For instance,
PK{(α, β, δ) : y = gαhβ ∧ y˜ = g˜αh˜δ ∧ (u ≤ α ≤ v)}
denotes a “zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge of integers α, β, and δ such that y =
gαhβ and y˜ = g˜αh˜δ holds, where u ≤ α ≤ v,” where y, g, h, y˜, g˜, and h˜ are elements
of some groupsG = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 and G˜ = 〈g˜〉 = 〈h˜〉. The convention is that Greek letters
denote quantities of which knowledge is being proven, while all other values are known
to the verifier. We apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [15] to turn such proofs of knowledge
into signatures on some message m; denoted as, e.g., SPK{(α) : y = gαgβ}(m).
Given a protocol in this notation, it is straightforward to derive an actual protocol
implementing the proof, where Fig. 1 outlines the compilation of the SPK above in the
Schnorr-proof variant that the Identity Mixer library [18]. While most this computation
is standard, highlight the prover’s dominant computation is on the commitment y˜ with
modular exponentiations in the number of secrets proven n. For the verifier, we have
n+ 1 modular exponentiations in the computation of his version of the commitment yˆ.
2.4 Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
Let us introduce Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures in a Strong RSA setting [9].
Let `M, `e, `N , `r and L be system parameters; `r is a security parameter, `M the
message length, `e the length of the Strong RSA problem instance prime exponent, `N
the size of the special RSA modulus. The scheme operates with a `N -bit special RSA
modulus. Choose, uniformly at random, R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z ∈ QRN .
The public key pk(I) is (N,R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z), the private key sk(I) the factor-
ization of the special RSA modulus. The message space is the set {(m0, . . . ,mL−1) :
mi ∈ ±{0, 1}`M}.
Signing hidden messages. On input m0, . . . ,mL−1 , choose a random prime number e
of length `e > `M+2, and a random number v of length `v = `N + `M+ `r. Compute
A =
(
Z
Rm00 . . . R
mL−1
L−1 Sv
)1/e
mod N.
The signature consists of (e,A, v).
To sign hidden messages, user U commits to l values V in an integer commitment
C and proves knowledge of the representation of the commitment. The issuer I verifies
the structure of C, which as we have seen in Fig. 1 will involve number of message
blocks l plus one modular exponentiations. Then, I signs the commitment:
A =
(
Z
CRmll . . . R
mL−1
L−1 Sv
′
)1/e
mod N,
which costs L − l + 1 modular exponentiations. The user completes the signature as
follows: σ = (e,A, v) = (e,A, (v′ +R)).
To verify that the tuple (e,A, v) is a signature on message (m0, . . . ,mL−1), check
that the following statements hold:Z ≡ AeRm00 . . . RmL−1L−1 Sv (mod N),mi ∈ ±{0, 1}`M ,
and 2`e > e > 2`e−1 holds.
Theorem 1. [9] The signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message at-
tacks under the strong RSA assumption.
Proving Knowledge of a Signature. The prover randomizesA: Given a signature (A, e, v),
the tuple (A′ := AS−r mod N, e, v′ := v + er) is also a valid signature as well. Now,
provided that A ∈ 〈S〉 and that r is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}`N+`∅ ,
the value A′ is distributed statistically close to uniform over Z∗N . Thus, the user could
compute a fresh A′ each time, reveal it, and then run the protocol
PK{(ε, ν′, µ0, . . . , µL−1) :
Z ≡ ±Rµ00 · · ·RµL−1L−1 A′εSν
′
(mod N) ∧
µi ∈ ±{0, 1}`M ∧ ε ∈ [2`e−1 + 1, 2`e − 1]}
3 Optimized Issuing of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
The key idea of our work is that the issuer is privy to the discrete logarithms of the
message bases and can use this knowledge together with his knowledge of the group
order to lift multi-base exponentiations to the exponent group Zord(G). We call this step
the discrete-logarithm reduction:
Definition 1 (Discrete-Logarithm Reduction). For a multiplicative cyclic group G
with known group order ord(G) and generator g, such that G = 〈g〉, we define the
discrete logarithm reduction as follows: On input of bases h0, . . . , h`, known discrete
logarithms xi = logS hi for 0 ≤ i ≤ `, and a description of a multi-base exponentiation
in G [C = hm00 · · ·hm`` gr], one computes
x := Σ`i=0(ximi) + r (mod ord(G)),
and subsequently outputs C := gx = hm00 · · ·hm`` gr in G.
In the following we re-define the CL-signature issuing and updating with the discrete-
logarithm reduction in a nutshell and will see that the reduction allows us render the
number of modular exponentiations independent from the number of message blocks.
3.1 Key Generation
We outline the interface of the key generation in Fig. 2.The parameters are chosen as in
standard CL-Signatures [18]. The scheme operates with a `N -bit special RSA modulus
in the cyclic subgroup of the Quadratic Residues QRN . We implement the random
choice of the bases R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z ∈ QRN :
– Compute a generator S of QRN with order p′q′.
– Choose uniformly random numbers xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 , xZ ∈R [2, p′q′ − 1].
– Compute Ri := SxRi mod N for 0 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 and Z := SxZ mod N .
By modular exponentiation with such a uniformly random exponent, R0, . . . , RL−1, Z
will be uniformly distributed in QRN , which is how the Identity Mixer Library [18]
implements the base generation. The public key pk(I) is (N,R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z) as
usual. Our scheme differs from the standard implementation by setting the private key
sk(I) := (p′, q′, xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 , xZ)
. Thus, we store the discrete logarithm between the message bases and generator S, an
overhead of L+ 1 group elements from Zp′q′ , and thereby establish the precondition of
the discrete-logarithm reduction from Def. 1.
3.2 Signing a Hidden Message
The interface of the revised issuing in Fig. 3 is fully compatible with standard Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature generation and follows the issuing specification of IBM Re-
search closely [18].1
1 Note that the specification [18] calls Mc, Mh and Mk: Ac, Ah and Ak. We have consistently
renamed those index sets to avoid confusion with the signature element A.
Inputs: The following system parameters are given:
`N : bitlength of the special RSA modulus,
`M: bitlength of the message space,
`e: bitlength Strong RSA problem instance prime exponent,
`r: security parameter,
L: total number of message bases.
Outputs: The issuer outputs a CL-keypair with an enhanced private key:
pk(I) = (N,R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z) and sk(I) = (p′, q′, xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 , xZ).
Signature proof of knowledge on the correct base generation ( all congruences modN ):
SPK{(α0, . . . , αL−1, αZ) : R0 ≡ ±Sα0 ∧ . . . ∧RL−1 ≡ ±SαL−1 ∧ Z ≡ ±SαZ}
Complexity: Probabilistic generation of two safe primes and a generator S of QRN . 2L+ 2 =
O(L) modluar exponentiations.
Public key size: L+ 3 group elements. Private key size: L+ 3 group elements.
Fig. 2. Interface of the Key Generation.
Inputs: Commitment of the user U = Sv′
∏
R
mj
j mod N , for j ∈ (Mc ∪Mh),
P1 = SPK{(ν′, µj |j ∈ (Mc ∪Mh)) : U ≡ ±Sν′Rµjj (mod N)}.
mi for i ∈Mk. CL-key pair: pk(I) = (N,R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z) and
sk(I) = (p′, q′, xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 , xZ).
Outputs: (A, e, v′′), P2 = SPK{(e−1) : A ≡ ±Qe−1(mod N)} and (mi)i∈Mk .
Compexity: Probabilistic generation of prime e, EEA to find e−1 (mod p′q′), overall five mod-
ular exponentiations (O(1) wrt. number of message blocks L).
Fig. 3. Interface of the Signature Generation (Round 2).
Verification of SPK P1. The issuer first needs to recompute his view of the user’s
commitment: [
Uˆ = U−cSvˆ′
∏
j∈(Mc∪Mh)R
mˆ mod N
]
[18]
We compute this value with the discrete-logarithm reduction:
xUˆ := vˆ
′ +Σj∈(Mc∪Mh)(xRjmˆ) mod p′q′ and Uˆ := U−cSxUˆ mod N. (1)
The remainder of the SPK-verification is as specified in the prelimiraries, §2. The verifi-
cation thereby takes two modular exponentiations, instead of |(Mc∪Mh)|+2 = O(L).
Generation of the Signature. The issuer chooses a random prime e.
Remark 1 (Prime Generation as Black Box). We treat the computation of a random
prime as a black-box algorithm and do not count its internal exponentiations. The ex-
pected runtime of a Rabin-Miller-based prime generation of e is O(`4e + `pt`3e) [22].
The issuer chooses a random integer v˜′ ∈ {0, 1}`v−1 computes v′′ := 2`v−1 + v˜. The
remaining specification requires to establish Q:[
Q = Z
USv′′
∏
i∈Mk
R
mi
i
mod N
]
[18]
We employ the discrete-logarithm reduction again for the remaining computations of
the signature generation:
xQ := xZ − v′′ −Σi∈Mk(ximi) mod p′q′ and Q :=
SxQ
U
(2)
The issuer finishes the signature generation with
A := Qe
−1 mod p′q′ mod N and P2 := SPK{(e−1) : A ≡ ±Qe−1 (mod N)}
and sends (A, e, v′′), P2 and (mi)i∈Mk to the user.
Instead of |(Mk)|+ 3 = O(L), the signature generation takes three modular expo-
nentiations (counting the SPK). Alltogether, instead of |(Mc ∪Mh)| + |(Mk)| + 5 =
O(L), we have five modular exponentiations for the entire process independent from
the number of message blocks L.
3.3 Credential Update
The Identity Mixer library [18] allows issuers to update a CL-signature as shown in
Fig. 4, operating on message block deltas: ∆mi := m¯i −mi for i ∈ Mk. We mention
the discrete-logarithm reduction for the credential update for completeness.[
Q¯ = Q∏
i∈Mk
R
∆mi
i
Sv′′
mod N
]
[18]
xQ¯ := v′′ +Σi∈Mk(xRi∆mi) mod p′q′ and Q¯ :=
Q
SxQ¯
mod N (3)
SPK{(e−1) : A ≡ ±Qe−1(mod N)} is computed as above. Instead of |(Mk)| + 3 =
O(L), the issuer takes three modular exponentiations.
Inputs: Q from a previous signature generation, old and updated message blocks (mi)Mk and
(m¯i)Mk .
CL-key pair: pk(I) = (N,R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z) and sk(I) = (p′, q′, xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 , xZ).
Outputs: (A, e, v′′), P2 = SPK{(e−1) : A ≡ ±Qe−1(mod N)} and (mi)i∈Mk .
Compexity: Probabilistic generation of prime e, EEA to find e−1 (mod p′q′), and three mod-
ular exponentiations.
Fig. 4. Interface of the Credential Update.
4 Analysis and Correctness Proof
We started from the observation that the issuer of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
knows the discrete logarithms between the generator S of the Quadratic Residue group
QRn and the remaining bases of the issuer’s public key.
Recall from §2 that S is a generator of the Quadratic Residues QRn with order
ord(S) = ord(〈S〉) = p′q′. In the key generation, these bases are computed by modular
exponentiations with uniformly chosen randomness
xZ , xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 ∈R [2, p′q′ − 1], as follows:
Z = SxZ mod N and Ri = SxRi for 0 ≤ i ≤ L− 1.
Given this key generation, the issuer can store the discrete logarithms between S and the
bases xZ , xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 as part of its secret key as proposed in §3.1. This is secure as
a malicious issuer could store the discrete logarithms from its key generation anyway.
In the following sections, we evaluate whether the discrete-logarithm reduction
yields the same results as the computations prescribed in the specification [18]. We
establish this for the archetypical computations for commitments and the signature gen-
eration and derive correctness of the concrete computations of the issuing protocol as a
consequence.
4.1 Commitment Structure Computation
The issuer needs to compute multi-base exponentiations of the form of an integer com-
mitment() for bases re-indexed to 0, . . . , ` wlog.):
C = Rm00 · · ·Rm`` Sv mod N.
We claim that the issuer can compute a single modular exponenttiation instead by re-
ducing the equation with the known discrete logarithms, Def. 1:
xC := xR0mi + . . .+ xR`m` + v mod ord(S) and C := SxC mod N (4)
Theorem 2 (Commitment computation with knowledge of base discrete-logarithms).
Given the knowledge of base discrete logarithms xZ , xR0 , . . . , xR` ∈R [2, p′q′−1] and
the knowledge of the order of the Quadratic Residue group ord(QRN ) = p′q′ an issuer
can compute a multi-base exponentiation
C = Rm00 · · ·Rm`` Sv mod N
in a single modular exponentiation in a discrete-logarithm reduction:
C := S(xR0m0+...+xR`m`+v mod p
′q′) mod N.
Proof (Correctness commitment compuation). With the knowledge of the discrete log-
arithms between the bases and generator S, we transform the given multi-base expo-
nentiation into a modular exponentiation by substituting the bases as expressions of S
and the discrete logarithms xZ , xR1 , . . . , xR` :
C ≡ (R0)m0 · · · (R`)m`Sv (mod N)
≡ (SxR0 )m0 · · · (SxR` )m`Sv (mod N) | Knowledge DLs x
≡ S(xR0m0+...+xR`m`+v) (mod N)
≡ S(xR0m0+...+xR`m`+v (mod ord)(S))) (mod N) | Sord(S) = 1 (mod N) (5)
≡ S(xR0m0+...+xR`m`+v (mod p′q′)) (mod N) | ord(S) = p′q′ (6)
In Equation 5, we perform a standard exponent reduction as usually performed with
Euler’s Theorem. Given that
Sord(S) ≡ 1 (mod N) we have Sm ≡ Sord(S)k+m′ ≡ Sm (mod ord(S)) (mod N).
In Equation 6, we use that the issuer knows the factorization of special RSA modulus
N and the group order of QRN . We conclude that a commitment structure computed
with the discrete-logarithm reduction is congruent with the a commitment structure
computed in the standard version. In consequence, the issuer can compute exponent xC
as a polynomial in Zp′q′ and perform just one modular exponentiation with it:
xC := xR0m0 + . . .+ xR`m` + v mod p′q′, by which (7)
Sx ≡ Rm00 · · ·Rm`` Sv (mod N)
Lemma 1. The signature verification of the SPK in Equation 1 of §3 with the discrete-
logarithm reduction is correct.
4.2 Signature Generation and Credential Update
Let us consider the final computation of a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature:
A =
(
Z
CRm00 . . . R
mL−1
L−1 Sv
′
)1/e
(mod N),
in which C is an integer commitment provided by the user. All other quantities are ex-
pressible with the generator S and the known discrete logarithms xZ , xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 .
Theorem 3 (Signature computation with knowledge of base disrete logarithms).
Given the knowledge of base discrete logarithms xZ , xR0 , . . . , xRL−1 ∈R [2, p′q′ − 1]
and the knowledge of the order of the Quadratic Residue group ord(QRN = p′q′ an
issuer can compute a multi-base exponentiation
A =
(
Z
CRm00 . . . R
mL−1
L−1 Sv
′
)1/e
(mod N)
in a product of two modular exponentiation of the form
A =
(
C−1
)1/e (
S1/e(xZ−xR0m0−...−xRL−1mL−1−v
′) (mod p′q′)
)
(mod N).
Proof (Correctness of signature computation). Following the method described above,
we transform the signature issuing to a single modular exponentiation:
A ≡
(
Z
CR
ml
l
...R
mL−1
L−1 S
v′
)1/e
(mod N)
A ≡
(
SxZ
C(SxRl )ml ...(S
xRL−1 )mL−1Sv′
)1/e
(mod N)
A ≡
(
1
C
SxZ
(S
xRl
ml+...+xRL−1mL−1+v
′
)1/e
(mod N)
A ≡
(
1
CS
xZ−(xRlml+...+xRL−1mL−1+v′)
)1/e
(mod N)
A ≡
(
C−1SxZ−xRlml−...−xRL−1mL−1−v
′)1/e
(mod N)
A ≡ (C−1)1/e (S1/e(xZ−xRlml−...−xRL−1mL−1−v′) (mod p′q′)) (mod N)
The signature computed with discrete-logarithm reduction is therefore congruent to the
one computed in the standard version. The issuer can compute
x := 1/e(xZ − xRlml − . . .− xRL−1mL−1 − v′) mod p′q′
and use that for a modular exponentiation to compute the signature efficiently:
A := C−1/eSx mod N
Lemma 2 (Correctness of Signature Generation and Credential Update). The sig-
nature generation in Equation 2 of §3.2 and in Equation 3 of §3.3 with the discrete-
logarithm reduction is correct.
5 Performance Evaluation
5.1 Asymptotic Complexity
The issuer it needs to store number of message bases L group elements from Zp′q′ in its
private key. We measure performance in the modular exponentiations, where we treat
probabilistic generation of primes and generator S as black box.
Definition 2 (Complexity Measure). We use modular exponentiation as principal unit
of computation for this analysis. Computational complexity is expressed as number
of modular exponentiations. We call the complexity constant, O(1), in the number of
message blocks L, if the number of modular exponentiations is independent from the
number of message blocks.
We evaluate various computations, where we find a representative structure which will
be further considered for the experimental evaluation:
C = Rm11 · · ·Rm`` Sv (mod N),
thus involve number of message based plus one n + 1 modular exponentiations. Mea-
sured in modular exponentiations as unit of computation, we gain a reduction from
O(n) to O(1) as shown in Table 1. We see in the experimental analysis of §5.2 that this
reduction is particularly visible if the CL signature scheme is employed for signatures
with a large number of message bases, for instance, in the area of graph signatures [17].
Table 1. Asymptotic complexity on #modular exponentiations (ModExp) for #message blocks L.
Operation Standard CL-Issuing [18] Optimized CL-Issuing
#ModExp O(L) #ModExp O(L)
Key Generation §3.1 L+ 1 O(L) L+ 1 O(L)
Signing Hidden Message §3.2 |(Mc ∪Mh)|+ |(Mk)|+ 5 O(L) 5 O(1)
Verification of SPK P1 |(Mc ∪Mh)|+ 2 O(L) 2 O(1)
Signature Generation |(Mk)|+ 3 O(L) 3 O(1)
Credential Update §3.3 |(Mk)|+ 3 O(L) 3 O(1)
Commitment Computation §4.1 `+ 1 O(L) 1 O(1)
Signing Operation §4.2 L+ 2 O(L) 2 O(1)
Remark 2 (Complexity in Input Bitlength). When measuring the computational com-
plexity we may also measure the asymptotic expected time wrt. to the bitlength of the
inputs (particularly significant for the probabilistic prime generation). In that case, the
complexity is dependent on the bitlength of the modulus `N and the bitlength of the
exponents, which may be `m, `n, `e, `v or length of associated random exponents.
However, the complexity differences by modulus bitlength and exponent bitlength are
dominated by the number of modular exponentiations in L.
5.2 Experimental Evaluation
We assume that issuer has established the Quadratic Residues QRn under a special RSA
modulus n as specified by the Identity Mixer Library, where the system parameters (`n,
etc.) are chosen exactly as prescribed in the library setup [18]. The performance analysis
is executed on 64-bit Java JDK 1.7.13 on a Windows 7 SP 1 Thinkpad X220 Tablet, on
Intel CPU i5-2520 with 2.5 GHz, 8 GB RAM, where all computations are performed
on one processor core only. The performance analysis uses the math utility functions
of the Identity Mixer Library for the computation of randomness and exponentiations,
that is, its MultiExp facility. Thus, both the standard and the optimized variant operate
under equal conditions.
Fig. 5(a) compares the following two computations (both modN ):
C := Rm00 · · ·Rm`` Sv and C := S(xR0m0+...+xR`m`+v (mod p
′q′)),
where the exponents are uniform random bitstrings of specified bitlength (|mi| =
`M ; |v| = `v) and where both equations operate on the same randomness. The inde-
pendent variables are the number of bases in the CL-Signature (on the x-axis) and the
modulus length (different series), the dependent variable is computation time in ms
(in log-scale on the y-axis). The analysis is performed for modulus bitlengths of 2048
and 3072 bits to evaluate the scalability over the modulus bitlength. We also provide
an analysis for small numbers of message blocks/bases in Fig 5(b): The optimization
is visible from the outset, where the standard CL-issuing crosses the 100ms boundary
with 8 message blocks.
Example 1 (Throughput for eID Cards). If one estimates the throughput of the com-
plete issuing §3.2 with a back-of-an-envelope calculation, say for 23 message blocks as
quoted in earlier studies as attribute number of an identity card [6] and a 3072-bit mod-
ulus, the standard scheme has a hourly throughput of less than 10k signatures (falling
with number of bases), whereas the optimized scheme of more than 65k signatures (in-
dependent of number of bases): Issuing signatures for an entire county of 80M people
takes about one year computing time with the standard scheme and 50 days with the
optimized scheme.
Example 2 (Feasibility of signing large topologies and data structures). If one takes
for granted for a moment that there may be applications for creating signatures (and
enable zero-knowledge statements) on committed elements of large-scale data struc-
tures [17], then using the optimization is imperative: Assuming a signing operation for
50,000 message blocks and 3072-bit modulus, the standard CL-issuing takes roughly
15 minutes for a single signature, the optimized version 765 ms. That means that the
optimized version can issue signature updates with high frequency, an important feature
for dynamically changing topologies.
6 Conclusion
We study the efficiency of the issuing of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures,
where we tackle the problem that the signing operation costs modular exponentiations
linear in the number of message blocks signed. This imposes a significant obstacle for
the broad adoption of the signature scheme and for applications which operate on large
numbers of message blocks. We observe that an issuer making full use of its knowl-
edge of discrete logarithms between the group generator and bases of its public key
can achieve great performance advantages. We employ a very simple technique of a
discrete-logarithm reduction to lift the computation of multi-base exponentiations in
all issuing steps to the exponent group. While the technique itself is already known in
cryptographic folklore, this is the first time that it is consistently applied to the issuing
of CL-signatures. We propose a variant of CL-issuing, which only uses a small constant
number of modular exponentiations and is highly performant. Signatures for even tens
of thousands of message blocks and strong key sizes can be computed in the order of
hundred milliseconds. With that the CL-signing time is on a par with standard signature
schemes— and we dare say that this is indeed issuing CL-signatures on speed.
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Fig. 5. Experimental performance analysis on standard and optimized issuing computations:
C = Rm11 · · ·Rm`` Sv mod N (standard) and C = S(xR1mi+...+xR`m`+v (mod p
′q′)) mod N
(optimized), where the x-axis contains the number of bases L and the y-axis a log-scale of com-
putation time in ms. The computation is performed with modulus sizes ln of 2048 and 3072.
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